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The use of information and communication technologies in the health and social service 
sectors, and the development of multi-centred and international research networks 
present many benefits for society:  for example, better follow-up on an individual’s states 
of health, better quality of care, better control of expenses, and better communication 
between healthcare professionals.   However, this approach raises issues relative to the 
protection of privacy:  more specifically, to the processing of individual health information.  
 
This data is defined as sensitive, notably by 
the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1 
(henceforth "Convention n°108") and the 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data2 
(henceforth "Directive 95/46/EC").  
Considering the nature of this data, 
processing is forbidden unless the individual 
consents or if provided by national 
legislation.   
This idea is echoed, in France, in its Loi 
n°78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés 
modified by Loi relative à la protection des 
personnes physiques à l’égard des 
traitements de données à caractère 
personnel du 6 août 2004 3  (henceforth "Loi 
78/17 modified in 2004"), in which article 8 
details a series of exceptions to this 
prohibition.4.  
However, this notion is not found in all 
legislation.  An analysis of European and 
Canadian documents demonstrates that 
generally health data is encompassed in 
notions and definitions of "personal 
information" or "personal data"5—in other 
words, all information that permits the direct 
or indirect identification of an individual.   
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Accordingly, "all information that allows the 
identification of an individual, whatever its 
range or degree of sensitivity, is therefore 
considered as personal data that receives 
equal protection under the law" (unofficial 
translation).6  
In contrast, the Canadian Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (henceforth, "PIPEDA")7, as 
well as provincial legislation in Alberta8 
Ontario,9 Manitoba10 and Saskatchewan11 
have adopted definitions of personal health 
data.  
Does this situation mean that the 
processing—computerized or otherwise—of 
data related to health differs according to the 
understanding of the legislator?  Our reading 
of the European and Canadian norms leads 
us to respond in the negative.  We argue 
that by "processing," legislators refer to 
events that occur throughout the lifecycle of 
these data: in other words, from the 
collection of the data to its destruction 
irrespective of its personal or “health” 
nature. 
This lack of a specific status for health data 
echoes fundamental principles set out since 
1980, in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Guidelines for 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data 12 (henceforth 
"OECD Guidelines"), which the countries in 
the European Union, as well as Canada, 
follow.  Does that mean that it is possible to 
communicate data electronically between 
Europe and Canada without taking special 
precautions?  We would say no, because 
this question requires us to reconsider the 
place of the individual concerned: in other 
words, the patient, the participant in a 
research project, or their legal 
representatives.  It is also necessary to 
rethink how the healthcare system is 
administered.  Indeed, does the 
management framework for such transfers 
have to be done in silo or from a network 
paradigm? 
 
To advance the latter option (as we will do 
and as other projects such as the Système 
d’Information du Réseau Intégré de Laval 
(SI-RIL) in Quebec and the personal medical 
file13 or "carte Vitale" in France have done) 
involves revising  the finality principle in 
order to ensure that the information used is 
of adequate quality for the intended 
purposes without creating the redundancy 
that results from repeated collections with 
privacy guarantees.  It also requires us to 
rethink the personal data protection 
framework, considering that citizens interact 
with a variety of entities and thus require a 
climate of confidence and transparency. 
This is particularly so because "the more the 
required information is considered 
‘sensitive,’ the more it is necessary to 
multiply the precautions in order to 
guarantee the necessary level of 
confidence" (unofficial translation).14
The understanding of crucial elements of the 
right of protection of health data 
necessitates framework in order to consider 
the challenges of computerized processing 
of health data. 
I. Processing computerized health data:  
current framework 
Normative instruments try to frame the 
processing of personal data for societies 
that increasingly function through networks.  
The observation of classical legal categories 
demonstrates that these texts indicate that 
"an organization may collect, use, or 
disclose personal information only for 
purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider are appropriate in the 
circumstances," 15 or to ensure that the 
development of computerization does not " 
violate human identity, human rights, 
privacy, or individual or public liberties" 
(unofficial translation).16 Though these texts 
are applicable within the scope they cover, 
the principles they prescribe are not 
necessarily applied to networks, that is, in 
interconnected environments in which 
information circulates in a multi-directional 
and non-hierarchical way.17  
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Consequently, how do we reconcile the 
need to exchange data between health 
professionals and/or researchers and the 
necessity of protecting individuals’ 
reasonable expectations for privacy?  How 
do we ensure that the legal standards 
protecting these expectations are binding for 
everyone in the network while making sure 
that the interpretation of these standards 
takes into account the proper functioning 
and efficiency of the network itself and 
allows people to have the best services? 
Does consent still have to be the most 
important element in the computerization of 
health and social services and the growing 
development of multicentric, international 
research projects?  Won’t making consent 
the most important element reduce the flow 
of data?  Isn’t it likely to reduce the amount 
of data kept by the health system? 
Though a significant part of the legal 
community remains attached to the 
supremacy of consent,18 it appears poorly 
adapted to protect rights in the univers of 
networks.  As practiced, consent seems 
more and more like a decoy since it seems 
to ensure individuals’ control over their own 
data.  The considerable number of 
exceptions as well as the way data circulate 
make consent naive at best, and at worst, 
an inadvisable instrument if we really do 
want to protect the privacy of participants.  
Faced with this situation, it is necessary to 
return to the essence of the relationship 
between an individual and a health 
professional and/or researcher and focus on 
the notion of confidence. 
Instead of an act of consent frozen in time, a 
bond of confidence requires one of the 
parties in the relationship to depend on the 
other for the whole lifecycle of the personal 
data, and more specifically, of the health 
data.  A true dialogue must be established 
between the transmitter and the recipient of 
the confidence, in order that the relationship 
remain transparent and to prevent mistrust 
from encroaching on confidence.  This 
sentiment, necessary in a commercial 
activity, 19 must also prevail when we 
consider the computerized treatment of 
health data. 
For that, it is important that the individual be 
informed about the purposes, which include 
the fact that the data could potentially be 
communicated, shared, or transferred 
electronically to another territory.  There 
should also be transparency regarding 
security measures taken to ensure 
confidentiality and the quality of data 
throughout its lifecycle or even regarding the 
possibility of access to this data.  The 
challenges of computerized processing of 
health data occur more at this level than at 
the level of research and the management 
of consent. 
II. Computerized processing of health 
data:  the issues 
To allow the development of computerized 
processing of health data compatible with 
the respect for privacy (be it the 
interconnectedness of health 
establishments, access to personal medical 
files, the establishment of a smart card or in 
multi-centred or international research 
projects), it is necessary to address the 
challenges inherent to the issue.  Without 
claiming to examine them all,20 it could be 
useful to insist on the management of 
access rights and transborder flows of data. 
Both European and Canadian standards 
require that processing occur with respect to 
individual rights such as  confidentiality and 
right to access.  These two precepts are 
antithetical only in appearance.  
Confidentiality does not imply that the health 
professional or researcher who collected an 
individual’s health data cannot disclose it, 
transfer it, or share it with third parties.  If we 
consider the multitude of exceptions 
contained in different documents aiming to 
protect the information that directly or 
indirectly identifies an individual,21 these 
precepts imply that the exchange must be 
done only between authorized individuals 
and then only for the purposes delineated.  
In summary, sharing health data is a 
widespread practice, and it is commonly 
done for excellent reasons and with respect 
for individual privacy. 
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It is therefore advisable to make sure that 
confidentiality is never breached in the chain 
of exchanges; in other words, during the 
transmission or during the storage of data in 
a bank, for example.  This is why 
confidentiality is linked with security 
measures.22 In this context, the 
management of rights of access becomes 
a crucial tool of protection.  The regulation of 
rights of access affects not only authorized 
individuals (generally speaking, health 
professionals and/or researchers in a 
research project) but also individuals (i.e. 
the patient, the research participant, or their 
legal representatives). 
Relating to authorized individuals, it is 
necessary to determine whether access is 
absolute or limited to certain elements of the 
health file and/or the research file.  
Consequently, according to the  choices of 
individuals, it is necessary to establish 
procedures allowing the identification of the 
person who wants to access a file and to 
determine his/her rights.  This concept is 
included in two recommendations of the 
Council of Europe:  one about the regulation 
of automated medical databanks and 
another about the protection of medical data 
(henceforth "Recommendation n°R(97)5"). 
Thus, in a project like the Canadian 
Molecular Cytogenetic Platform (henceforth 
"CMCP"),23 it was decided that a doctor 
and/or researcher associated with the 
project could consult the files created by 
other members of CMCP.  It is important to 
note that these files did not contain any 
identifying information about the individual, 
as stated in the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement:  Ethical Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans,24 Recommendation 
n°R(97)5,25 and the "Loi 78/17 modifiée en 
2004". 26 Moreover, authorized access did 
not affect the information in the central 
databank, only the information which 
resulted from the research network(s) with 
which it was associated.  There is therefore 
a control and a hierarchy of rights of access 
to the identifying information and the 
password. 
 
Regarding the individuals involved, it is 
generally recognized that they have the right 
to access their own data.27  However, taking 
into account the health repercussions of 
communicating this information, do we have 
to have a paternalistic approach to this 
right?  Do patients or research participants 
directly exercise this right or do they have to 
ask their health professional and/or 
researcher to exercise this right for them?  
While some countries have long recognized 
the right of every individual to act directly, 
others have accepted this option only in the 
last few years and still work through an 
intermediary:  for example, in France, where 
Loi n° 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux 
droits des malades et à la qualité du 
système de santé adopted this approach in 
article L. 1111-7 of the public health act.28  
Irrespective of whether these rights are 
exercised directly or not, the corollary is to 
allow the individual to ask for correction, 
even the suppression of all their data, with 
some exceptions:  for example, aggregate 
data in a research project.  This right—of 
access and of correction—must be carried 
out by the person responsible for the data 
processing.   
This action by the individual also gives 
him/her the option of knowing whether 
his/her data has been tranferred across 
borders (transborders flows).  In effect, 
whether we consider European29  
(especially Directive 95/46/EC) or Canadian 
instruments, we see that they take into 
account the possibility of communication, 
sharing, and transferring individuals’ health 
data to another province or another country, 
with the understanding that this would not 
change the rules about the protection of 
personal data in the original territory.  
Consequently, the person responsible for 
the processing must ensure that the territory 
of destination for the data offers similar 
protection to that of the original territory.  
This precaution requires an extensive 
evaluation of the standards in use: for 
example, when a project entrusts data 
conservation to an operator outside the 
original nation or develops research that 
regroup different countries or provinces. 
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It is thus possible to state that the framework 
applied to all personal data, health data or 
otherwise, are similar in the countries of the 
European Union as in Canada, .  As 
indicated earlier, these two entities have the 
same fundamental principles in terms of the 
protection of information that identifies, 
directly or indirectly, an individual.  
Consequently, it is possible to carry out 
computerized processing of health data 
between them after a preliminary analysis of 
the risks. 
Conclusion  
This analysis of the legal framework applied 
to the automated processing of health data 
indicates the necessity to reconsider the 
principles surrounding the protection of 
personal data in order to adapt them to the 
electronic environment.  The changes 
induced by the move to information and 
communication technologies in health and 
social services must be accompanied by a 
redefinition, on the one hand, of the role of 
each party, making the distinction between 
authorized individuals and others affected by 
the data and, on the other hand, of the 
space in which personal data circulates. 
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